presumption Archives | Both Parents Matter

When Parliament considers reforms to family law—particularly those affecting children—one would expect rigorous scrutiny, balanced evidence, and properly tested assumptions. Yet, as Clause 17 of the Courts and Tribunals Bill progresses, a deeply concerning reality emerges:

The repeal of the presumption of parental involvement is advancing without a single witness formally called to oppose it. That is not a minor procedural gap. It goes directly to the integrity of the legislative process.

What Clause 17 Actually Does

Clause 17 proposes to remove the statutory presumption—introduced in 2014—that a child benefits from the involvement of both parents in their life, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

This presumption has always been carefully qualified:

It is rebuttable where there is any risk of harm
It does not override the welfare principle
Courts already retain full discretion to restrict or prevent contact

In short, it is not a rigid rule—it is a starting point.

The Government’s stated intention is to move away from what it characterises as a “pro-contact culture” and to ensure that safety is prioritised. But removing a presumption is not a technical adjustment. It is a fundamental shift in how the system frames parenthood after separation.

A One-Sided Evidence Base

The parliamentary scrutiny process—based on the published witness list—reveals a striking imbalance.

Oral evidence has been drawn overwhelmingly from:

Domestic abuse advocacy organisations
Legal practitioners aligned with safeguarding reform
Campaigners critical of the current framework

What is notably absent:

No organisations representing shared parenting
No academic defence of the presumption as a welfare safeguard
No structured evidence from those working with non-resident parents
No direct challenge to the assumptions underpinning repeal

This matters. Parliament is designed to test competing arguments, not simply to validate a single narrative.

Legislating on the basis of unchallenged evidence is not robust scrutiny—it is policy-making in an echo chamber.

What the Government’s Own Evidence Previously Found

The current justification for repeal becomes even more difficult to sustain when set against the Government’s own findings.

Started under the previous Conservative administration, but concluded under this one, a detailed review of the presumption examined whether it had led to harmful outcomes.

It concluded:

There was no evidence that the presumption itself was harmful to children or that repealing it would do any harm
But that the presumption should be repealed to tackle what activists have termed a “pro-contact” culture in the courts which might cause harm, despite the review providing no evidence of such a culture existing nor of any harm resulting.

This is a critical contradiction.

The central rationale now being advanced—that the presumption distorts decision-making and risks harm—was not supported by the Government’s own analysis.

In any evidence-led system, such a shift would require new, compelling data. That case has not been clearly made.

Why the Presumption Matters

The presumption of parental involvement serves as a normative anchor within family law. It does not force unsafe contact. It does not override judicial discretion. Instead, it establishes a simple but important principle:

Where it is safe, children benefit from meaningful relationships with both parents.

This principle influences:

Judicial starting points
Parental expectations
The tone and direction of proceedings

Removing it does not create neutrality—it removes a counterbalance within an already complex and adversarial system.

In a jurisdiction frequently criticised for delay, inconsistency, and subjectivity, the loss of such a guiding principle risks increasing uncertainty rather than reducing it.

The Risk of Policy by Narrative

There is no doubt that tragic cases have played a powerful role in shaping the current reform agenda. These cases deserve attention, accountability, and where necessary, systemic improvement.

But public policy must be grounded in system-wide evidence, not driven primarily by exceptional circumstances.

The key question remains insufficiently examined:

Is the issue the existence of the presumption—or failures in how risk is assessed and managed?

The Government’s earlier findings suggest the latter.

Yet instead of addressing practice—training, evidential standards, consistency—the response has been to remove the principle itself.

Without opposing evidence presented to Parliament, this distinction has not been properly tested.

A Missing Voice in Parliament

Perhaps the most striking feature of this reform is not simply what is being proposed—but who has not been heard.

No witness appears to have been called to argue that:

Children benefit from safe, ongoing relationships with both parents
The presumption provides stability in contested proceedings
The system must address misuse, delay, and evidential imbalance—not just contact outcomes

This absence is not incidental. It creates the impression of policy formed within a closed evidential loop, rather than through the adversarial scrutiny Parliament is designed to provide.

Conclusion: Reform Requires Balance, Not Silence

Clause 17 represents one of the most significant shifts in family law in a generation.

Reform may well be necessary. Safeguards must be robust. Failures must be addressed.

But the removal of a long-standing legal presumption—particularly one the Government itself previously found neither harmful nor misapplied at a systemic level—demands the highest standard of scrutiny.

That standard has not been met.

A reform of this magnitude should not proceed on the basis of uncontested evidence and untested assumptions. The stakes—measured in children’s lives—are simply too high.

Crucially, repeal without replacement creates a vacuum. Without a more balanced and structured reform—such as the introduction of a Parental Relationship Test, explicitly assessing each parent’s role in supporting a child’s relationship with the other—this change risks doing more harm than good.

In the absence of such balance, the likely consequences are clear: